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One consequence of Indonesian fiscal decentralization is that local governments will 
have to seek additional revenues coming from their own resources, especially local taxes. 
For the first year of the implementation of decentralization alone, they had authorized 
approximately 1000 new taxes and charges in order to increase revenues with hoping 
these taxes would help to boost their local economic growth. The effects of taxes on the 
economic growth have been an interesting topic for decades in all around the nation. 
However, empirical studies of the relationship between taxes and economic growth have 
produced inconsistent results. This paper attempts to study the effect of taxes on 
economic growth by conducting a quite massive literature review of the relationship 
between taxes and economic growth. Tax variables in the state level studies are shown to 
have ambiguous effects on the economic growth. On the other hand, tax variables in 
international level studies are generally shown to have a negative effect on economic 
growth. The policymakers in Indonesian local governments need to be careful in 
designing a new tax structures after fiscal decentralization. Imposing new taxes to pump 
up revenues with hoping that it would help boosting the economic growth or improving 
the economic performance should also consider the fact that taxes tend to have a negative 
effect on economic growth. 
                                                 
1This paper is heavily based on chapter two in my doctoral dissertation, entitled: “An Empirical Analysis of 
Taxation and State Economic Growth”. I would like to thank Bob Reed, my advisory committee chairman 
and other committee members for their helps, encouragement, and helpful suggestions. I would also thank 
Armida Alisjahbana for asking me to write this paper. All remaining errors are my responsible. 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
 
The effects of taxes on the economic growth have been an interesting topic for 
decades in all around the world. Vedder (1995) finds that higher state and local taxes had 
a significant negative effect on personal income growth from 1960 to 1993.  A study by 
Becsi (1996) also shows that relative marginal tax rates have a statistically significant 
negative relationship with relative state growth over the period 1961 to 1992. On the 
other hand, a significant minority of studies such as Quan and Beck (1987), Yu, Wallace, 
and Nardinelli (1991), and Chernick (1997), reports no evidence to support a hypothesis 
that state taxes lower economic growth, in fact they find some positive correlations 
between tax variables on economic growth. 
  Indonesia has been going through a major change in its intergovernmental system 
since 1999 by adopting a much more decentralized regime, widely termed fiscal 
decentralization. In May, 1999 two very important Laws concerning regional autonomy 
and decentralization was signed by the government, i.e. Law 22, 1999 on regional 
government and Law 25, 1999 on central and regional government financial relations.  
  Local governments now have more responsibility to provide public goods and 
services that were previously provided primarily by the central government through its 
de-concentrated ministries or agencies. On the other side, local governments also have 
greater power, at least in theory, to manage and collect their own revenues, especially 
taxes
2.  
                                                 
2 It should be noted that the central government must still give some subsidies or grants to local 
governments when the primary objective is that of redistribution. The grants, however, are to be distributed 
based on a new formula that is especially designed to support the fiscal decentralization program.   3 
  Today, Indonesian local governments are enormously concerned about having 
revenue shortfalls because of decentralization and also concerned about increasing 
economic growth to prove the success of decentralization. For the first year of the 
implementation of decentralization alone (up to the end of 2001), they had authorized 
approximately 1000 new taxes and charges. Even so, Lewis (2003) finds no empirical 
evidence that the creation of those new taxes is driven by lack of fiscal capacity, as many 
people believe. In fact, the creation of those new taxes is also driven by beliefs that more 
taxes means more revenues, and further this will result with higher economic growth.  
  This paper attempts to study the effect of taxes on economic growth by 
conducting a quite massive literature review of the relationship between taxes and 
economic growth. Empirical studies of the relationship between taxes and economic 
growth have produced inconsistent results.  Most studies find a negative correlation 
between taxes and economic growth.  However, a significant minority of studies reports 
no correlation, and some find evidence of a positive relationship. This paper tries to 
identify estimation issues on taxes’ effect on economic growth by reviewing: (i) 
empirical studies that exploit differences within and across states in the U.S., and (ii) 
empirical studies that exploit differences within and across countries.  Most U.S. studies 
focus on the forty-eight, continental states.  In contrast, there is great diversity in the 
composition of the data sets used by researchers using international data. It is expected 
that this paper would give some suggestions and knowledge to policymakers of the 
Indonesian local governments on the consequences of taxing before hurriedly imposing 
any new taxes after fiscal decentralization. 
   4 
  The rest of paper is organized as follows:  Section II presents possible avenues by 
which taxes could affect growth rates. Section III briefly explains the fiscal 
decentralization in Indonesia. Section IV and V present reviews of the existing 
quantitative and qualitative empirical literature pertaining to the effect of taxes on 
economic growth both state-level studies in the US and country-level studies. Section VI 
discusses what we can learn from the reviews. Finally, Section VII provides conclusion. 
I.  How Taxes Could Affect Growth Rates? 
In theory, taxes levied by the government may have both positive and negative effects on 
economic growth. The positive effects of taxation can be explained by the fact that the 
value of economic resources and the ability to transform resources into output are greater 
to the degree that property is protected, roads and telecommunication infrastructures are 
provided, and domestic tranquility is insured. If growth was higher in these public sectors 
and tax revenues are used to finance these sectors, the higher taxes would be associated 
with higher economic growth. 
  The negative effects of taxation could be explained by the concept of “deadweight 
loss” of a tax. When a tax is imposed on a good, the tax reduces consumer and producer 
surpluses by an amount that is greater than the tax revenue generated. The difference 
between the decrease in total consumer and producer surplus and total tax revenues is 
referred to as the deadweight loss of taxation. As the tax gets larger, the deadweight loss 
increases more proportionate to the tax increases.  
III.   Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia 
One impact of the economic and political crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997-1998 
was an increased pressure for regional autonomy, known as fiscal decentralization. As a   5 
result, the government passed two new decentralization laws: Law No. 22/1999 on 
Regional Government and Law No. 25 /1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central 
and Local Governments. Both were implemented as of 2001. These new laws 
substantially reform the practice of intergovernmental relations in Indonesia. If they are 
successfully implemented, Indonesia will be transformed from one of the most 
centralized among large economies to one of the most decentralized [IMF, 2002]. Alm, 
Aten, and Bahl (2001) consider Indonesia an exception compared to other economies 
with its characteristics, such as a large and diverse population residing in a very large 
area, as their empirical results implied that Indonesia would have been expected to adopt 
a more decentralized government much earlier. 
In addition, the government passed Law No. 34/2000 on Regional Government 
Taxes and Charges. This law states which taxes can be levied by local governments, and 
the tax rates allowed. To avoid double taxation, only certain goods and services can be 
taxed by provincial and district governments, and to prevent overcharging (as defined by 
the central government), the range of tax rates is also set by the central government. This 
law replaces the old law on the same matter, with the main difference being that it gives 
local governments more alternatives and flexibility for their own revenue sources.  
It is true that local governments now have greater responsibilities to provide 
public goods and services; however, the central government still has some indirect 
control over local governments’ expenditures by setting up some standards or criteria that 
have to be met by local governments. Local governments still seem not have too much 
discretion over provision of public goods and services to their people, since the level of 
expenditure is still implicitly determined by the central government. In summing up, local   6 
governments might need even bigger additional revenues, especially from local taxes, 
retribution, and fees. 
IV.   State-Level Analyses in the US 
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979).  Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) are 
primarily interested in the effect of tax progressivity on state income growth.  Using 
single equation, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, they employ three 
dependent variables: (i) growth rate in state personal income, (ii) growth rate in state non-
agricultural employment, and (iii) growth rate in state per capita personal income. The 
data employed by Romans and Subrahmanyam consist of cross-sectional observations of 
the forty-eight contiguous states from 1964 to 1974. 
Romans and Subrahmanyam use two groups of explanatory variables in their 
models, tax variables and control variables. Three tax variables are included: (i) tax 
progressivity, (ii) personal income tax rate, and (iii) business tax rate.  Tax progressivity 
is shown to have a negative and significant effect on the growth rate in state personal 
income and state non-agricultural employment equations.  The personal income tax rate 
is estimated to be insignificantly correlated with income growth; while business tax rate 
is positively and significantly related with economic growth 
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) conclude that the level of state personal 
income taxes is unrelated to economic growth. On the other hand, the level of state 
business taxes is positively and significantly related to the growth.  Tax progressivity is 
estimated to have a significant and negative effect on the growth.  
Dye (1980). Dye (1980) investigates twenty-one potential determinants of 
economic growth. He examines simple bivariate relationships between alternative   7 
explanatory variables and three different measures of economic growth:  (i) growth in 
personal income (1972-1976), (ii) growth in employment (1972-1976), and (iii) growth in 
value added by manufacturing (1972-1976). He groups the potential determinants of 
economic growth into two categories, tax variables and non-tax variables. Related to this 
paper objectives, I only focus on the tax variables that are further categorized into two 
groups: (i) tax burdens (including total tax burden, income tax burden, and sales tax 
burden); and (ii) business tax rates (including corporate taxes, worker income taxes, and 
executive income taxes). The author uses cross-sectional data consisting of observations 
from the fifty states over the period 1972-1976.  The values for the explanatory variables 
are taken from 1970 or earlier. 
Simple bivariate analyses find no evidence that any of the tax variables affect 
economic growth.  The multivariate analyses also found little evidence that taxes matter.  
Only the growth of value added by manufacturing equation produced a significant tax 
result.  In that equation, tax burden is negatively and significantly related to economic 
growth.  Dye (1980) concludes that there is little correlation between taxes and economic 
growth. 
Helms (1985).  Helms (1985) is one of the first studies to use cross-sectional time 
series (panel) data.  He is interested in identifying the separate, independent effects of 
taxes and spending on state per capita personal income.  He uses a least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) model that incorporates both state and time fixed effects.  He also uses 
instrumental variable techniques to address endogeneity in one of the explanatory 
variables.    8 
Helms (1985) uses the log of state personal income as the dependent variable. Tax 
variables include (i) the rate of property taxation and (ii) the rate of taxation from all 
other taxes.  He also includes the rate of user fees.  All rates are calculated as a percent of 
state personal income. 
 The estimates suggest that increasing taxes or fees to finance transfer payments 
has a negative and significant effect on a state’s personal income. The coefficients for 
many of the expenditure variables are positive and significant.  Helms’s data consists of a 
panel of observations on the 48 continental states from 1965 to 1979, totaling 672 
observations.  
Canto and Webb (1987).  Canto and Webb (1987) estimate individual time-series 
equations for each of the states to determine the relationship between taxes and economic 
growth.  With the assumption of factor price equalization but possible inequality in per 
capita market incomes across states, they argue that, “divergences in market incomes 
across states is attributable, in part to the impact of state government fiscal policies on the 
supply of services of the immobile factor of production across states” (p. 187). Further, 
they state: “. . . the after-tax factor return and/or income of the immobile factor need not 
be equalized across states. Therefore, within this scenario, state and local fiscal policy 
can influence the income and after-tax return of the immobile factor across states” (p. 
189).  
   The dependent variable in Canto and Webb’s study is the change in the log of 
state real per capita personal income. The tax variable is the change in the difference 
between the state tax rate and the national tax rate.  Canto and Webb (1987) estimate 
separate models for each state.  They use both OLS and 2SLS regression.  The 2SLS   9 
regression is employed to address possible endogeneity in state taxes and transfers.  They 
conclude that taxes have significant and negative effects on state real per capita personal 
income. The spending variables have insignificant coefficients.  Canto and Webb (1987) 
use observations on the forty-eight continental states from 1957-77.   
Quan and Beck (1987). Quan and Beck (1987) are primarily interested in 
estimating the effect of education expenditures on state economic growth.  The dependent 
variables used in their empirical analysis are: (i) state relative to national personal 
income; (ii) state relative to national wage rate; and (iii) state relative to national 
employment in manufacturing sectors. The tax variables employed are current and lagged 
values of state tax burden relative to national tax burden, where tax revenues exclude 
severance taxes.  
Quan and Beck’s (1987) with respect to taxes, find evidence that current and 
lagged values of state tax burden positively impact economic growth. These positive 
estimates occur in all model equations. However, the significance levels vary between the 
two subsamples. The estimate of tax variable is significant in the Northeast region of the 
US but insignificant in the Sunbelt region of the US.  
Quan and Beck (1987) use cross-sectional and time series data for 32 states for 
the fiscal years 1964 through 1983. The equations’ regressions are estimated on two sub-
samples: the “Northeast”, including 15 states in the New England, Mid-east, and Great 
Lakes regions (excluding Michigan); and the “Sunbelt”, including 17 states in the 
Southeast and Southwest regions plus California.  
Vedder (1990). Vedder (1990) places the relationship between state and local 
taxes and economic growth within two models of public provision of services.  The first   10 
model represents public provision of services using the theory of the firm/public choice 
approach.  In this model, taxes are also viewed as potential income in the form of 
economic rents that can be appropriated by special interests (e.g. public employees, such 
as when compensation is paid to public employees beyond levels required by market 
forces).  Vedder (1990) also sees the relationship between state and local taxes and 
economic growth being shaped by the Tiebout Hypothesis.  According to this theory, 
individuals migrate in and out of localities based upon their preferences for government 
services.   
The dependent variable in Vedder’s (1990) study is the change in the log of state 
per capita personal income (1970-1980). Another model uses the same variable for the 
period from 1980 through 1988. As the tax variable, Vedder uses the change in state and 
local tax rate per $1,000 of personal income.  
The results show that positive changes in state tax rates are negatively and 
significantly associated with lower state economic growth. The negative and significant 
relationship is estimated to be stronger in the 1980s than the 1970s. The continued 
negative correlation of tax changes to economic growth in both models strengthens 
confidence in the enduring nature of the tax-growth relationship.  
Vedder (1990) employs cross-sectional data comprised of observed changes in the 
forty-eight continental states over two time periods: (i) 1970-1980, and (ii) 1980-1988.   
Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (1991). Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (1991) test two 
hypotheses about state income growth.  The first is income convergence, or the “catching 
up” hypothesis. The second is that taxes discourage economic growth (the fiscal 
hypothesis).    11 
They start their analysis with the assumption that states have different levels of 
physical capital, human resources, and technology. Mobility of capital and resources, in 
the long run, should cause the respective rates of return to equalize across states.  
However, equalization will be incomplete since there are permanent barriers between 
political jurisdictions.  Alternatively, differences in fiscal environments between 
jurisdictions can lead to different growth rates: fiscal differences generate differences in 
growth rates due to different marginal tax rates.  Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) 
address the question:  What force is stronger in determining economic growth? (i) 
continuing adjustment to historical imbalance (convergence), or (ii) the effects of current 
fiscal policy decisions (taxation)? 
Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) examine seven time periods: 1929 to 1985; 
1929 to 1945; 1945 to 1957; 1957 to 1985; 1957 to 1965; 1965 to 1975; and 1975 to 
1985.   For each time period, they estimate a regression equation using the percentage 
change in real state per capita personal income as the dependent variable.  For the tax 
variable, they use the ratio of state taxes to personal income.  The catching up hypothesis 
predicts that the rate of growth of real per capita personal income will be inversely 
related to real per capita personal income at the beginning of period.  Relatively poor 
states should grow faster than relatively wealthy states.  The hypothesis of fiscal policy 
predicts that increased expenditures will generate increased economic growth; whereas 
increased taxes will hinder economic growth.  
The results of Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli’s study (1991) show that catching up 
exerts a powerful influence on states’ rates of growth. The coefficient signs of initial 
income are negative and statistically significant in all equations. Convergence appears to   12 
explain the long-run differences in state growth. In contrast, state fiscal policies are 
estimated not to be significant determinants of state growth rates. Initial expenditure 
performs poorly in every specification and time period. Likewise, there is little evidence 
to support the hypothesis that state taxes lower economic growth.   
Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) use cross-sectional observations from all 50 
states.  Per capita personal income is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Mullen and Williams (1994).  A distinctive feature of the study by Mullen and 
Williams (1994) is its emphasis on marginal tax rates.  Similar to other studies, Mullen 
and Williams incorporate convergence theory in their analysis. However, they argue that 
differences in fiscal and/or other public policies can generate permanent differences in 
the level of state per capita income.  For example, some states may provide an 
economically attractive tax environment that is conducive to private investment.  
Mullen and Williams (1994) develop an ad hoc empirical model, but claim that 
their model draws heavily upon the disequilibrium-adjustment models popularized in 
migration research. Mullen and Williams further explain that the disequilibrium-
adjustment model is the model that “typically relates changes in the dependent variable 
over the period to levels of the explanatory variables at the beginning of period” (p. 691). 
There are three model specifications analyzed in their study: (i) a basic output and 
productivity equation, (ii) a basic output equation based upon the stock of public capital, 
and (iii) a basic output and productivity equation excluding outlier states.
3  
Dependent variables consist of the compound annual growth rate of (i) real Gross 
State Product, 1969-1986 and (ii) productivity growth (compound annual growth rate of 
                                                 
3 Arizona, Louisiana, New York, and South Dakota are found to have a substantial impact on a 
majority of the regression coefficients. So they are excluded to generate a better empirical result.   13 
real Gross State Product minus factor share-weighted growth in capita and labor inputs, 
1969-1986). Tax variables used in Mullen and Williams (1994) measuring both the 
average and marginal tax rates. 
Mullen and Williams (1994) are interested in determining whether taxes depress 
economic growth. They find that average tax rates are generally insignificant in all model 
specifications. On the other hand, marginal tax rates are found to be negatively and 
significantly related to economic growth. Further, states with tax rates that are high 
relative to neighboring states have slower rates of economic growth. 
The data employed by Mullen and Williams (1994) consist of cross-sectional 
observations of the forty-eight, continental states 1969 through 1986 (except one model 
specification where four outlier states are excluded).   
Becsi (1996).  focuses on the phenomenal growth of the southern states in the US.  
At issue is the role that state and local taxes may have contributed to this growth.  
According to Becsi (1996), taxes raise the costs and lower the returns of taxed activities.  
This creates incentives for individuals and businesses to engage in activities that are 
taxed at lower rates.  The result is inefficient resource allocations and, ultimately, lower 
economic growth.  Like Mullen and Williams (1994), Becsi (1996) argues that marginal 
tax rates are more important than average tax rates in affecting behavior, and hence, 
growth. 
Becsi’s dependent variable is the difference in average, annual growth rates of per 
capita personal income (PCPI) between the state and the nation (1961-1992).  He 
employs two tax variables: (i) relative marginal tax rate, and (ii) a measure of relative tax 
progressivity (a kind of balanced budget condition).  The one non-tax variable is the   14 
initial, relative PCPI. As discussed above, the initial PCPI is included to capture 
convergence effects in the data.  Becsi’s data consist of cross-sectional observations from 
all fifty states where data are averaged for the 1961-1992 period and initial PCPI is from 
1960.  
Becsi (1996) concludes that relative marginal tax rates are negatively and 
significantly related to relative state economic growth over the period 1961 to 1992.  This 
suggests that economic policies that lower marginal taxes rates may result in increased 
long-term economic growth. 
Chernick (1997).  Chernick (1997) focuses on the relationship between state and 
local tax incidence and economic growth.  He explains that the crucial determinant of tax 
incidence is the relationship between (i) the level of income and (ii) the demand for the 
public goods and service.  The lower the income elasticity of demand for public goods 
and services, the less progressive the tax system.  The greater the progressivity of a 
state’s tax system, the greater the likelihood that mobile factors will migrate out of that 
state.  According to this argument, increased tax progressivity will be negatively related 
to economic growth.  
Chernick (1997) employs a cross-sectional time series dataset of forty-seven 
states (Hawaii, Alaska and Wyoming are excluded) from 1977 to 1997.  The dependent 
variable is the growth rate in real PCPI measured over three separate time periods: 1977-
1985, 1985-1989, and 1991-1993.  The tax variables consist of (i) tax burden and (ii) a 
measure of tax progressivity.  The estimated results indicate that all tax variables 
employed have insignificant effects on the growth rate of real PCPI.  Tax progressivity 
has a negative coefficient estimate while tax burden has a positive coefficient estimate.   15 
Chernick argues that one possible explanation for the insignificance of the tax variables is 
that inefficient tax structures respond to poor economic performance rapidly enough to 
prevent an observable effect on the economic base. Another possible reason is that tax 
structure is not responsive to changes in the tax base, at least in the short run period.  
Yamarik (2000).  Yamarik (2000) examines the effect of state tax policy on state 
economic growth using cross-sectional observations from forty-eight, continental states 
from 1977 to 1995.  He distinguishes taxes paid on income, consumption and property: 
“the effects of taxation are disentangled by estimating disaggregate personal income, 
general sales and property tax rates” (p. 212).  Yamarik predicts that higher income tax 
rates and property tax rates decrease the growth rate of employment, investment, and 
income.  In contrast, he does not expect consumption or sales tax rates to affect growth, 
because it does not affect the return of capital like income and property taxation. 
Yamarik (2000) employs the following dependent variables: (i) the average 
growth rate in Gross State Product (GSP); (ii) the average growth rate in GSP per worker 
(average productivity); (iii) the average growth rate in the labor quantity; and (iv) the 
average ratio or real investment to GSP. Tax variables consist of: (i) average tax rate with 
respect to GSP, (ii) average tax rate with respect to property, (iii) marginal tax rate with 
respect to GSP, (iv) marginal tax rate with respect to personal income, and (v) marginal 
tax rate with respect to general sales.  
Yamarik (2000) obtains mixed results with respect to the tax variables.  The 
marginal tax rate with respect to GSP is estimated to have a positive coefficient in the 
GSP regression, but a negative coefficient when the dependent variable is the ratio of 
investment to GSP.  On the other hand, the average tax rate enters negatively in both   16 
regressions.  In contrast, the disaggregated tax rates are generally consistent with 
Yamarik’s predictions.  Accordingly, Yamarik (2000) concludes that disaggregated tax 
rates provide a better measure of tax distortions. 
V.   Country-Level Empirical Growth Studies 
Koester and Kormendi (1989)  Koester and Kormendi (1989) examine the impact 
of average and marginal tax rates on the level and the growth of economic activity.  The 
study is motivated by supply-side hypotheses that predict that higher rates of taxation will 
inhibit economic activity and/or economic growth.  Koester and Kormendi (1989) use 
two dependent variables in their regression model: (i) the growth rate in real GDP (1970-
1979); and (ii) the level of per capita GDP (1980).  Both average and marginal tax rates 
are included as explanatory variables, along with initial per capita GDP. 
Koester and Kormendi (1989) estimate that marginal tax rates negatively and 
significantly affect the level of per capita GDP.  The authors employ cross-sectional 
observations of sixty-three countries using averaged data from 1970 through 1979.  
Levine and Renelt (1992).  Levine and Renelt (1992) use extreme-bounds analysis 
(EBA)
4 to test the robustness of coefficient estimates to alterations in the conditioning set 
of information.  Accordingly, they provide evidence on the sensitivity of past studies to 
small alterations in the explanatory variables commonly used in growth studies. 
Dependent variables used by Levine and Renelt (1992) are (i) the average annual 
growth rate of real per capita GDP (1960-1989), and (ii) the investment share (1960-
1989). The explanatory variables consist of fifty-two variables measuring economic, 
political, and institutional factors.  Included among fiscal policy variables are a wide 
variety of tax and expenditure variables, including the ratio of individual income tax 
                                                 
4 see Leamer (1983) for detail explanation of this method.   17 
receipts to GDP.  They find that very few economic variables are robustly correlated with 
cross country growth rates or the ratio of investment expenditure to GDP. Levine and 
Renelt (1992) use data from 119 countries from 1960 to 1989.   
Easterly and Rebelo (1993).  The main focus of Easterly and Rebelo’s study 
(1993) is to test the effect of fiscal policy variables on economic growth. They use 
standard data sources combined with newly created data for public investment. The 
neoclassical theory of endogenous growth provides the theoretical framework for their 
study. 
The growth rate of real per capita GDP (1970-1988) is the dependent variable. 
Tax variables include various average and marginal tax rates.  Since data on cross 
country marginal tax rates are not observable, Easterly and Rebelo compute marginal 
income tax rates using four approaches: statutory tax rates, a fraction of revenue to GDP, 
income-weighted marginal tax, and regression results from regressing revenue from each 
type of tax on GDP. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) conclude that the evidence for whether tax rates 
matter for economic growth is fragile.  On the other hand, there is strong evidence that 
income affects tax rates. This evidence follows “Wagner’s Law,” which states that 
government expenditure is endogenous to economic development; as development 
proceeds there will be a long-run tendency for the public sector to grow relative to 
national income.
5 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) use cross-sectional data consisting of observations 
from 105 countries over the period 1970-1988.  They also utilize a cross-sectional, time 
                                                 
5 The long-run tendency is caused by many factors such as a substitution of public for private sector 
activity, an increase in cultural and welfare expenditures by the state, and government intervention to 
manage and finance natural monopolies.   18 
series dataset consisting of 28 Latin American and OECD countries from 1870 through 
1988.   
Engen and Skinner (1996).  Engen and Skinner (1996) review existing studies on 
taxation and economic growth in order to estimate the growth impact of a major reform 
of the tax system in the U.S.  They first examine the historical record of the U.S. 
economy for evidence of tax cut effects on economic growth.  In the second step, they 
consider the evidence from large samples of countries. Finally, they evaluate the evidence 
from micro level studies of labor supply, investment demand, and productivity growth. 
Engen and Skinner’s study does not undertake any original estimation work. 
Engen and Skinner (1996) make a number of useful points. First, it reviews the 
major arguments relating taxation to economic growth. Second, it lists the econometric 
shortcomings of many studies. In particular it notes the problem of “reverse causality” 
saying that “….reverse causality is really the Achilles’ heel of the typical cross-country 
regression.  Nearly every variable on the right-hand side of the regression is suspect.” (p. 
630).  Third, it estimates the following tax effect: a five percentage point decrease in 
marginal tax rates is estimated to increase annual growth by 0.28 percentage points in the 
short run and 0.22 percentage points in the long run. Finally, the composition of the tax 
system is important. Countries with a more efficient tax administrative and enforcement 
system will be more likely to enjoy faster economic growth. 
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997).  The main point of a study by 
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) is to test the effect of tax policy on economic 
growth.  The authors base their empirical model on endogenous growth theory, which is   19 
driven by the accumulation of factors of production (human and physical capital) and 
“Constant Return to Scale” technologies.  
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) use the growth rate of per capita real 
GDP for their dependent variable.  Tax variables include: (i) the GDP share of 
government purchases which can be interpreted as an overall tax rate; (ii) the tax rate on 
labor; (iii) the tax rate on consumption; and (iv) the tax rate on personal income.  
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) find that taxes have negligible growth 
effects.  There is no evidence that tax rates affect the income growth in the long run. In 
contrast, there is some evidence that taxes have transitional effects that disappear over 
time.  They also recognize the importance of correcting for the endogeneity of tax rates 
with respect to income. 
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) employ cross-sectional and time series 
data consisting of observations of eighteen OECD countries from 1966 until 1990. Using 
five-year averaging procedures, they obtain a total of ninety observations.  
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999).  Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel (1999) 
test the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth.  For the dependent variable, the 
authors use per capita growth in GDP.   Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) find that 
tax coefficients have a significantly strong negative impact on economic growth.  They 
also report evidence that fiscal policy has effects that last longer than five years.  They 
address a number of econometric concerns.  However, they find that their results are 
robust to the endogeneity problem, sample selection, and regression specification.    20 
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel (1999) use a cross-sectional, time series dataset 
consisting of twenty-two OECD countries from 1970 to 1995.  Data are averaged over 
five-year periods to produce a total of 110 observations.   
Padovani and Galli (2001). Padovani and Galli (2001) test the effect of tax rates 
on cross-country economic growth.  The authors attempt to improve on Koester and 
Kormendi (1989), Levine and Renelt (1992), by producing longer time series of marginal 
tax rates and including a level and a slope dummy to capture the effects of tax reforms on 
tax rates.  Padovani and Galli (2001) also check the robustness of their estimates using 
extreme bound analysis (EBA). Padovani and Galli (2001) use the growth rate in GDP as 
their dependent variable. Explanatory tax variables consist of the marginal tax rate and 
the government consumption share of GDP (as a measure of the average tax rate).   
Padovani and Galli (2001) estimate that increased marginal tax rates are 
associated with lower economic growth.  This result appears robust to change in model 
specification.  Their sample is a cross-sectional and time series dataset consisting of 
twenty-three OECD countries from 1951 to 1990.  Using ten-year averaging, they obtain 
a total of ninety-two observations. 
Foelster and Henrekson (2001).  Foelster and Henrekson (2001) restrict their 
analysis of taxes and economic growth to rich countries.  They argue that rich countries 
share many unobserved characteristics that non-rich countries do not possess.  
Accordingly, including of non-rich countries results in omitted variable bias that distorts 
the estimation of tax effects.  For their sample, the authors select twenty-three OECD 
countries from 1970 to 1995.  The authors engage in extensive robustness testing, 
including Leamer’s EBA. The authors use the growth rate in per capita GDP for their   21 
dependent variable. The tax variable is average tax rate, measured by total taxes as a 
share of GDP.   
Foelster and Henrekson (2001) conclude that taxes are negatively and 
significantly related to economic growth.  This finding is found to be robust with respect 
to sample selection.  The result is maintained even when the sample is extended to 
include non-OECD countries. 
VI.   What Can We Learn from This Literature Review? 
Tax variables in the state level studies are shown to have ambiguous effects on the 
economic growth. Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) show that business tax rate has a 
significantly positive effect on economic growth while tax progressivity has a 
significantly negative effect.  Chernick also finds that tax progressivity has a negative 
effect. In contrast, he estimates a positive coefficient sign for tax burden though it is 
significant in only some of the regressions.  Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) 
show that all tax variables except consumption taxes have negative and significant effects 
on economic growth. Distortionary taxes have a negative effect on growth while non-
distortionary taxes have a positive but insignificant effect according to Kneller, Bleaney, 
and Gemmel’s studies (1999 and 2001).  
  Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller (2001) claim that government fiscal effects may 
have both short- and long run effects. The authors do Wald χ
2 tests to find the appropriate 
lag length of fiscal variables.  They find evidence that fiscal effect last eight years.   
Previous studies identify at least five different ways that taxes might affect 
economic growth.  The first is that higher taxes on corporate and individual income can 
discourage investment.  Second, taxes may reduce labor supply growth by discouraging   22 
labor force participation.  Third, tax policy may attenuate research and development 
(R&D) and development of “high-tech” industries.  Fourth, tax policies can influence the 
marginal productivity of capital by encouraging businesses to move from heavily-taxed 
sectors with high level of productivity to lesser-taxed sectors with lower productivity. 
Finally, heavy taxation on labor supply will discourage workers from working in sectors 
with high social productivity. With lower labor and capital productivity, economic 
growth will be diminished. 
VII. Conclusion 
Table 1 and 2 summarizes the estimated effects of tax variables on income growth 
in the state level studies in the US and country level studies. Tax variables in the state 
level studies are shown to have ambiguous effects on the economic growth. On the other 
hand, tax variables in international level studies are generally shown to have a negative 
effect on economic growth. The policymakers in Indonesian local governments need to 
be careful in designing a new tax structures after fiscal decentralization. Imposing new 
taxes to pump up revenues with hoping that it would help boosting the economic growth 
or improving the economic performance should also consider the fact that taxes also have 
a negative effect on economic growth as shown by many empirical studies reviewed in 
this paper. In consider to different characteristics between Indonesia and the US of 
America or countries that all empirical studies reviewed use as the case, I encourage 
researchers to begin conducting empirical study about the effect of taxes on provincial 
economic growth with Indonesian case. Equipped with advance theories of taxes, growth 
and also the appropriate econometrics method such as pooled or panel data, this kind of 
study would give benefits to all Indonesian community and society.  23 
Table 1: The Effects of Fiscal/Tax Variables on Economic Growth: States’ Studies in the 
US. 
States’ Studies  Fiscal/Tax Variable  Sign  Significant 
Romans and 
Subrahmanyam (1979) 
•  Tax Progressivity 
•  Personal income tax rate 







Dye (1980)  •  Total tax burdens 
•  Income tax burden 
•  Sales tax burden 
•  Business tax rates 
•  Workers’ income taxes 













Helms (1985)  •  Property tax 





Canto & Webb (1987)  •  Change in state relative to 
national tax burden 
-  Yes 
Quan and Beck (1987)  •  Current state relative to 
national tax burden 










Vedder (1990)  •  Change in state and local tax 
burden 
-  Yes 
Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli  •  Tax burden  +/-  Sometimes 
Mullen and Williams 
(1994) 
•  Average tax rates 





Becsi (1995)  •  Relative marginal tax rate 





Chernick (1997)  •  Tax burden 





Yamarik (2000)  •  Tax burden with respect to GSP 
•  Tax burden with respect to 
property 
•  marginal tax rate with respect 
to GSP  
•  marginal tax rate with respect 
to personal income 
•  marginal tax rate with respect 


















Sometimes   24 
Table 2: The Effects of Fiscal/Tax Variables on Economic Growth: Countries’ Studies 
Countries’ Studies  Fiscal/Tax Variable  Sign  Significant 
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and 
Asea (1997) 
•  Tax on Consumption 
•  Tax on Labor 
Income 
•  Tax on Capital 
Income 
•  The ratio of 
Individual Income 
















Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel 
(1999) 
•  Distortionary Tax 






Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller 
(2001) 
•  Distortionary 
Taxation 
-  Yes 
Padovano and Galli (2001)  •  Marginal Tax Rate  -  Yes 
Foelster and Henrekson (2001)  •  Tax burden with 
respect to GDP 
•  The ratio of 
government 
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